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ployment and wage inequality in the presence of a link between social benefits and
average income. In this case, an increase in the productivity of skilled workers and
hence their wage leads to an increase in average income and hence in benefits. The
increased fallback income, in turn, makes unskilled workers ask for higher wages. As
higher wages are not justified by respective productivity increases, unemployment
rises. More generally, we show that skill-biased technological change leads to increas-
ing unemployment of the unskilled and to a moderately increasing wage inequality
when benefits are endogenous.
The model provides a theoretical explanation for diverging dynamics in wage in-
equality and unemployment under different social benefits regimes: Analyzing the
social legislation in 14 countries, we find that benefits are linked to the evolution of
average income in Continental Europe but not in the U.S. and the UK. Given this
institutional difference, our model predicts that skill-biased technological change leads
to rising unemployment in Continental Europe and rising wage inequality in the U.S.
and the UK.
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1 Introduction
The well documented increase in wage inequality in the U.S. and the UK in the 1980s and
early 1990s is attributed to an increase in the demand for skills that has been faster than
the increase in skills supply. Predominantly so-called skill-biased technological change is
blamed for the rapid increase in the demand of skills.1 In most of Continental Europe,
wage inequality increased much less if at all; instead it experienced a significant increase
of unemployment, especially of the low-skilled.
Mainly, three arguments have emerged in the literature to explain the differences in the
evolution of wage inequality. First, some authors argue that the supply of skills increased
faster in Europe than in the U.S./UK (see Nickell and Layard (1999), and Leuven, Oost-
erbeek, and van Ophem (2003)). This approach is not able, however, to account for the
differential evolution of unemployment. The second, and maybe most important, approach
argues that collective bargaining and labor market institutions kept the wage structure
compressed in Europe implying that skill-biased technological change has been leading
to increasing unemployment.2 The role of labor unions has obtained considerable atten-
tion (eg, Lindbeck and Snower (2001)). Labor market institutions as the unemployment
insurance system and employment protection (eg, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)), or
minimum wages (eg, Teulings (2003)) have also obtained attention in the literature. The
major theoretical drawback of the institutional approaches is that they mostly explain
differences in the level of unemploym nt and the level of wage dispersion. Only few3 can
explain a widening gap of wage dispersion and unemployment as long as the institutions
are unchanged.4 Thirdly, and more recently, it has been argued that the demand for
high-skilled increased less in Europe, because there, high wages for the low-skilled work-
ers create an incentive for firms to invest in unskill-biased technologies, implying that
technical progress is on average less skill-biased in Europe (see Acemoglu (2002)).
Our paper contributes to the view that it is the institutions that matter for the di-
verging evolution between the U.S./UK and Continental Europe. Our model is able to
reproduce the differential dynamics of unemployment and wage inequality and not only
levels. We argue that in Europe, skill-biased technological change has adverse effects on
employment of unskilled workers because their wages are linked to the skilled workers’
wages. This link is established by the indexation of social benefits to per-capita income.
Modern welfare states usually possess social protection systems including schemes that
provide needy people with subsistence benefits. Often, the level of benefits is linked to
the evolution of wages or per-capita income. The reason for this is that benefits are paid
1See, eg, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2003), and Green, Fel-
stead, and Gallie (2003). Other factors affecting the relative demand for skills that have been identified in
the literature are organizational changes (eg, Lindbeck and Snower (1996) and Falk (2002)) and globali-
sation of goods and labor markets (see, eg, Fenstra and Hanson (1996), Baldwin and Cain (2000), Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1996), and Tombazos (1999)).
2See, eg, Krugman (1995), Katz and Autor (1999), Blau and Kahn (1996), and Acemoglu (2002).
Fewer authors argue that both, the stylized differences between the U.S. and Europe and the labor market
rigidities used to explain these differences, are overstated in the above literature (see, eg, Nickell (1997),
Gregg and Manning (1997) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005)).
3Krugman (1995) is such an exception. He uses the ad hoc assumption that—due to labor market
institutions, the wage for unskilled labor is proportional to the wage for skilled labor.
4Admittedly, it has been noted in the literature that institutions have changed in reaction to shocks,
such as skill-biased technical change. There has been a tendency towards deunionization in the U.S. and UK
while, at least in the beginning of the 80s in Continental Europe employment protection was strengthened
and benefits of the unemployment insurance have become more generous (see Blanchard (2006).)
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to avoid poverty so that their level must be closely related to the “subsistence level”.
But the subsistence level is a relative concept and so is poverty.5 Therefore benefits in
general depend on the average wealth of a society. The strength of this link, however,
varies across countries. We find that in most of Continental Europe the level of benefits is
tied closely to per-capita income while in the Anglo-Saxon countries the benefits level has
not been adjusted to per-capita income over the last 20 years. We show that this institu-
tional difference is able to explain the transatlantic differences in wage and employment
dynamics.
Endogeneity of the level of benefits with respect to the average income is important
for labor market outcomes because it establishes a link from skilled workers’ productivi-
ties to unskilled workers’ wages: Changes in skilled workers productivities affect average
income and thereby the level of benefits. This increase in the fallback income improves
the bargaining position of the unskilled workers. In general this will result in higher wages
and—for lack of respective productivity gains—higher unemployment.6
To demonstrate the mechanisms, our baseline model considers a “European” economy
with skilled and unskilled labor. We assume that the market for skilled labor clears, while
the market for unskilled labor does not. In the baseline model the wage for unskilled
labor is determined by a monopolistic labor union while employment is determined by
competitive firms.7 Thus, the focus of this paper is on the (strikingly large) extent to which
the unskilled workers’ rate of unemployment exceeds that of the skilled workers. The fact
that unemployment also exists among the skilled workers might indeed be explained by
considerations of insider-outsider relations, search frictions, efficiency wages, or the like.
These theories might be seen as complementary rather than contradictory to this paper.
The findings of the baseline model (and its generalizations) are consistent with the
evolution of wages and employment of unskilled workers in Europe over the past decades.
Wages for all skill levels have risen over this period and, by and large, the employment
prospects of the less skilled workers have deteriorated.8 In the United States (and the UK),
it seems, that a shift in labor demand has led to an increase in wage inequality while in
(Continental) Europe, where the wage structure has remained fairly stable, it resulted in
a rise in unemployment, in particular among unskilled workers (see, eg, Siebert (1997)).9
This coincidence of rising wage inequality in the United States and rising unemployment
(at rather stable relative wages) in Europe suggests that the kind of feedback mechanism
described in the our baseline model has been an important feature of labor markets in
Continental Europe but not in the U.S. and the UK. We show that, on the basis of only
5See, eg, Foster (1998): “Absolute versus Relative Poverty” and the other contributions to the session
on “What is Poverty and Who are the Poor?” in the AEA Papers and Proceedings Issue of the American
Economic Review of May 1998.
6In fact, most benefit systems have unemployment insurance elements that depend on the level of
past earnings rather than the general income level of the economy. Note, however, the following: First,
unemployment insurance benefits are generally limited in duration. So, in the long run, it is social benefits
that constitute the fallback income. Second, for unskilled workers, unemployment insurance benefits may
easily fall short of the level of social benefits. In this case, the payment is increased to this level.
7Gu¨rtzgen (forthcoming) shows that the impact of unions on wages is largest at the lower end of the
skill distribution.
8See, eg, Siebert (1997), Katz and Autor (1999), or Acemoglu (2002). For Germany a detailed analysis
of the employment and wage development from 1975 through 1990 is performed in Fitzenberger (1999).
9We are aware that the view that increasing unemployment in Continental Europe and increasing wage
inequality in the U.S. and the UK are two sides of the same coin (namely skill-biased technological change)
is not beyond controversy (see, eg, Nickell and Bell (1996), and Gregg and Manning (1997)). Yet, there
seems to have emerged a large consensus among many economists that this view explains at least parts of
the intercontinental differences (see, eg, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 10.
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one institutional difference, namely the link between benefits and per-capita income, we
can explain this difference in employment and wage dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the question
whether and how tightly different countries link their benefit payments to the average
income for a selection of OECD countries. The model is set up in Section 3. Comparative
static results and the implications of our model with respect to the transatlantic differences
in the social legislation are discussed. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Transatlantic Differences in the Social Legislation
In this section we analyze the legal situation both in Continental Europe and in the U.S.
and the UK to demonstrate how benefits depend on per-capita income in different welfare
systems. We find that in the United States and the UK benefits have not been adjusted
to average income in the last 20 years, while in most European countries this adjustment
is automatic and by law. Having observed this, in the next section our model shows that
it is precisely this institutional difference that can account for diverging experiences in the
evolution of wage inequality and unemployment.
We are aware that this binary classification into European and Anglo-Saxon countries
is crude. There is substantial variation in the social legislation within these groups of
countries.10 But, when it comes to the evolution of benefits over time, the similarities
within and the disparities between these two groups of countries are striking: In most
European countries, these benefits depend on per-capita income by law, while this is not
the case in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Let us consider the European countries first. In some countries, the adjustment of the
benefits level over time is automatic by law, ie, there is a clear adjustment frequency and
there are clear rules to what the benefits level is to be adapted. In other countries the
legislation gives more scope to the government or the parliament to act and adjustments
are discretionary. In some countries where there exist rules for the adjustment of benefits,
the evolution of benefit payments is linked to the evolution of wages and/or income while
in others, benefits are linked to consumer prices. Figure 1 in the appendix contains a
synopsis of the social legislation in a selection of countries. In most European countries
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal), welfare benefits
are automatically linked to the evolution of average wages, average income or public pen-
sions (which on their part are linked to the evolution of average wages or average income)
by law. Exceptions are Belgium, France, Greece and Spain. In Greece a general income
support scheme does not exist. We discuss the remaining three countries in Appendix A.1
and provide empirical evidence that is in accordance with our main hypothesis.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, on the other hand, benefits are not linked to average wages
or income. In the UK, “income support” is tied to the evolution of consumer prices
only.11 In the U.S., the institutional and legal situation is more complex.12 Summarizing
10There have been several attempts in the European Union to harmonize social legislation - without
much success, though. Two of the more successful attempts have led to the European Social Charter of
1989 and to the social protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 - both not signed by the United
Kingdom. If compared to other policy areas of the European Community, the treaties on social standards
remain vague.
11There were no additional discretionary increases between 1979 and 2001 (see Cantillon, van Mechelen,
Marx, and van den Bosch (2004)).
12For a concise overview, see Uccello and Gallagher (1997) from where most of the following information
3
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the discussion from our working paper (see Weiss and Garloff (2005)), we can conclude,
that none of the U.S. income support programs links benefits to the evolution of average
income or wages. In fact, in many cases, amounts are not even adjusted for inflation.
Figure 1 in the appendix summarizes the institutional setting. It shows that welfare
benefits are linked to average wages or income by law in most of Continental Europe but
not in the U.S. and the UK. In Appendix A.1, we take a closer look at those European
countries, that have no legal automatic link between benefits and wages or income and
provide empirical evidence that is in accordance with our assumptions. The next section
containing the baseline version of our model demonstrates that this institutional difference
in the determination of benefits can account for diverging experiences in the evolution of
employment and inequality.
3 The Model
3.1 The Baseline Case: Europe
Consider an economy with a continuum of mass 1 of homogeneous firms producing a single
good. The good is produced using two input factors, unskilled and skilled labor. There is
a continuum of mass 1 of workers of each type. Each worker supplies one unit of labor.
For simplicity, the model is essentially static. There is no capital in the model so that
consumption equals production at any point in time.
The firm produces according to the production function Y = (au · lu)ρ+(as · ls)ρ , 0 <
ρ < 1, 0 < au < as where Y is the quantity of the final good, lu and ls are the levels
of employment of unskilled and skilled labor respectively, and ρ, au, and as are produc-
tivity parameters. This specification has the following properties. First, the elasticity of
substitution between unskilled and skilled labor is σ = 1/ (1− ρ) > 1. We restrict the
analysis to substitution elasticities larger than one because only in this case does skill-
biased technological change have adverse effects on the relative position of the unskilled
workers. Furthermore, the majority of the empirical estimates are between 1 and 2 (see,
eg, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)). Second, the marginal productivities of unskilled
and skilled workers are independent of each other and the cross wage elasticities of the
factor demands are zero. We make this arguably strong assumption to guarantee that
any relation between the wages for the two kinds of labor that arises in the model can be
attributed solely to the institutional peculiarities.
These restrictions are also for simplicity. In Weiss and Garloff (2005), we consider the
case of a more general CES (constant elasticity of substitution) technology. The results
are shown to be independent of these different specifications.
Firms sell their products on the world market at the world market price P = 1 (by
choice of the nume´raire). At given wage levels, firms choose the level of employment so as
to maximize their profits pi = Y − wu · lu − ws · ls. The demand for unskilled and skilled
labor is respectively
ldu (wu) =
(
ρ · aρu
wu
) 1
1−ρ
and lds (ws) =
(
ρ · aρs
ws
) 1
1−ρ
, (1)
where wu and ws are the wages for unskilled and skilled labor respectively.
is taken.
4
Page 5 of 16
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The model involves unemployment of unskilled workers. All unemployed individuals
are assumed to receive benefits, w˜. In accordance with the reasoning in the introduction,
the benefits are assumed to depend on the net average income w˜ = µ · (1− t) · Y2 , where
Y/2 is the per-capita income, t is the income tax rate, and µ ∈ [0, 1] is a proportionality
factor. The benefits are financed through a proportional income tax. The tax rate t is
endogenously determined by the government’s budget constraint (1− lu) · w˜ = t · Y .
All unskilled workers are assumed to be members of a labor union. The union chooses
the wage to maximize the expected labor income of its members.
U = E [net labor income|wu] = lu (wu) · (1− t) · wu + [1− lu (wu)] · w˜ (2)
The first term in expression (2) represents the probability for any union member to become
(or remain) employed (conditional on the wage level) times the net wage of employed
unskilled workers. The second term represents the conditional probability to become
unemployed times the alternative income (ie, benefits).
We assume that the market for skilled labor clears. This determines the wage for skilled
labor ws = ρ · as. The wage for unskilled labor is assumed to be determined by a mo-
nopolistic labor union whereas the firm has the “right to manage”. The union maximizes
its objective function taking into account the effect of the wage level on employment. We
assume that, out of idleness or lack of comprehension of the economic system, the union
does not consider the second-round effects the wage has on the level of benefits and on the
tax rate.13 In the formal model, this means that the objective function (2) is maximized
subject to (1) but taking the level of benefits w˜ and the tax rate t as exogenously given.
Solving the maximization problem yields the following result which is familiar from the
literature.14
Lemma 1 Under the above assumptions, the wage for unskilled labor, wu, is an increasing
function of the level of benefits, w˜ :
wu =
w˜
ρ · (1− t) . (3)
In contrast to standard union models (and in contrast to what the union takes into
account), in this model, the level of benefits is a function of the net average income which,
in turn, is a function of the wage for unskilled labor. Accounting for this endogeneity in
(3) yields15
w∗u =
1
2
· µ
ρ
·
[(
ρ · au
w∗u
) ρ
1−ρ
+ aρs
]
. (4)
The equilibrium wage for unskilled labor, w∗u, is implicitly given by this equation.16 It is
easily verified that under the above assumptions, an equilibrium, w∗u (au, as, µ, ρ), exists
and is unique.17
13This assumption is also for simplicity. In Weiss and Garloff (2005), we consider the case where the
union takes into full account the effects of the wage level on the level of benefits and the tax rate. The
results are virtually unaffected.
14See, eg, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 7.
15Equations (3) and (4) are two different ways of writing down the same result. In equation (3) the
focus is on the dependency of the unskilled workers’ wage on the level of (endogenous) benefits while in
equation (4) the unskilled workers’ wage is shown as a function of the exogenous parameters of the model.
16Throughout the paper, the term “equilibrium” will be used to refer to the allocation which results
from union wage setting, given the other institutional features of the model.
17Existence: For wu sufficiently small (resp. sufficiently large), the right hand side of the equilibrium
5
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3.2 Comparative Statics
The comparative static properties of the equilibrium allocation are presented in the fol-
lowing propositions:
Proposition 1 An increase [respectively decrease] in the unskilled workers’ productivity,
as measured by the productivity parameter au, leads to an increase [respectively decrease]
in both, the equilibrium wage and the level of employment of unskilled labor.
∂w∗u
∂au
· au
w∗u
=
ηY,lu
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (5)
∂l∗u
∂au
· au
l∗u
=
ρ− ηY,lu
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (6)
where ηY,li =
∂Y
∂lu
· luY .
A decrease in the unskilled workers’ productivity leads—via a decrease in the average
income—to a decrease in the unskilled workers’ wage. But this decrease is less than would
be required by the productivity loss because the wage is linked to the average income level
which decreases by less than the unskilled workers productivity. Therefore unemployment
of the unskilled increases. This failure of the wage to fully adjust to changes in productivity
can be seen as a rigidity in the relative wage wu/ws.
While the wage for skilled labor always adjusts to clear the market, the wage for
unskilled labor depends on the productivities of both, unskilled and skilled workers. In
other words, the wage for unskilled labor is linked to the wage for skilled labor. The
relative wage cannot fully adjust to changes in the relative productivity. This rigidity
leads to an increase in unemployment in response to a decrease in the productivity for
the unskilled workers. Similar results are obtained in standard union models where the
reservation wage of the workers is exogenous.
Proposition 2 An increase [respectively decrease] in the skilled workers’ productivity, as
measured by the productivity parameter as, leads to an increase [respectively decrease] in
the wage for unskilled labor and a decrease [respectively increase] in the level of employment
for unskilled workers.
∂w∗u
∂as
· as
w∗u
=
(1− ρ) · ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
> 0 (7)
∂l∗u
∂as
· as
l∗u
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 (8)
The increased productivity of the skilled workers leads to a rise in the average income.
This in turn increases—through higher benefits—the unskilled workers’ reservation wage
and thereby their wage. Since the productivity of the unskilled workers remains unchanged,
unemployment increases.
While the result in Proposition 1—that the wage falls too little in response to a fall
in the productivity of the unskilled—is also obtained in standard union models, the result
condition (4) is larger (resp. smaller) than the left hand side. As both sides of the equation are continuous
in wu there must exist at least one value of wu, w
∗
u, for which both sides are equal. Uniqueness: The
left hand side of (4) is strictly increasing in wu whereas the right hand side is strictly decreasing in wu.
Therefore, if a solution to (4), w∗u, exists, it must be unique.
6
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in Proposition 2—that the wage increases too much in response to a productivity gain of
the skilled workers—is unique to this model where the feedback mechanism from income
levels to wages is accounted for. In this model, the driving force behind both effects is the
above mentioned rigidity in the relative wage.
Propositions 1 and 2 consider cases where only one type of labor becomes more produc-
tive. Depending on whose productivity increases, unemployment increases or decreases.
Since in reality, technological change tends to affect the productivities of different types
of labor at the same time, the question naturally arises which of the two opposite effects
dominates. The following Proposition answers this question.
Proposition 3 Technological change leads to a decrease [respectively increase] in employ-
ment of the unskilled and an increase [decrease] in wage inequality whenever it leads to an
increase [decrease] in asau .
∂l∗u
∂ asau
·
as
au
l∗u
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 (9)
∂(wswu )
∗
∂ asau
·
as
au
(wswu )
∗ =
ρ ·
( ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
1− ρ+
( ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
> 0 (10)
Skill-biased technological progress favoring the skilled workers’ productivity in a way
that leads to an increase in as/au has a negative effect on the relative demand for unskilled
labor, ldu/l
d
s . Since the relative wage for unskilled labor, wu/ws, cannot fully adjust to this
shift in labor demand, unemployment of unskilled workers increases.18 On the other hand,
if the productivity of unskilled workers grows faster [or falls more slowly] than the skilled
workers’ productivity, the wage for unskilled labor increases [respectively falls], but by less
[respectively more] than would be justified by the shift in the relative productivity so that
the employment of unskilled workers increases. Any technological change that leaves the
ratio as/au unaffected has no effect on the level of employment.
This result is consistent with the view that it is the same factors that boost wage
inequality in the U.S. and the UK and result in higher unemployment in Continental
Europe. In a model in which the welfare system is less generous and wages are to a
greater extent market-determined—the alleged features of U.S. and UK labor markets—
skill-biased technological change (in the form of an increase in as/au) leads to a stronger
increase in wage inequality while unemployment is affected less or not all. Appendix A.2
provides some descriptive evidence for this result.
Increasing trade with and outsourcing to low-wage countries have been cited as a
second culprit of the rise in wage inequality in the United States.19 In fact, in a two-sector
version of this model, it can be shown that increasing trade with low-wage countries (as
modeled by a decrease in the relative price of the import good—whose production is
assumed to be intensive in the use of unskilled labor) has exactly the same effect on wages
and employment as skill-biased technological change (as modeled by an increase in as/au).
18It is easily verified that
∂( ws
wu
)∗
∂ as
au
·
as
au
( ws
wu
)∗ = ρ ·
(
ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
/(
1− ρ+
(
ws
wu
as
au
) ρ
1−ρ
)
is unambiguously
smaller than ρ, the respective elasticity that prevailed if wages were perfectly flexible.
19See, eg, Fenstra and Hanson (1996), and Baldwin and Cain (2000).
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Increasing trade with low-wage countries also leads to a (downward) shift in the relative
demand for unskilled labor. As the relative wage for unskilled labor does not fully adjust,
unemployment of unskilled labor rises.20
3.3 Wage and Employment Dynamics: Anglo-Saxony vs. Continental
Europe
In this section, we explore the implications of our model for the differences in wage and
employment dynamics between Anglo-Saxon countries (AS) and Continental European
countries (EU). For ease of presentation, we denote asau ≡ α and wswu ≡ ω and normalize
the productivity parameter of unskilled labor to 1. The technology is thus given by
Y = lρu + (α · ls)ρ. Benefits are given by
w˜ = µ ·
(
(1− t) ·
(
Y
2
))ξ
(11)
where ξ = 1 in Europe and ξ = 0 in Anglo-Saxon countries. As expounded in Section 2,
benefits are tied to the evolution of average income in Europe, but not in the U.S. and
the UK.
In both regimes, the wages for unskilled and skilled labor are given by wu = w˜ρ·(1−t)
and ws = ρ · αρ. Taking into account the differences in the determination of benefits the
relative wage for skilled labor is given by
ωEU =
2(
ωEU
α
) ρ
1−ρ + 1
· ρ
2
µ
and ωAS = αρ · ρ
2
µ
(12)
in European and Anglo-Saxon countries respectively. The effect of skill-biased technolog-
ical change on wage inequality is given by(
∂ω
∂α
· α
ω
)
EU
=
ρ · (ωα) ρ1−ρ
1− ρ+ (ωα) ρ1−ρ and
(
∂ω
∂α
· α
ω
)
AS
= ρ (13)
It is easily shown that
(
∂ω
∂α · αω
)
EU
<
(
∂ω
∂α · αω
)
AS
as long as ρ < 1. The effect of skill-biased
technological change on wage inequality is smaller in European countries, where the linkage
of benefits to the evolution of average income keeps the wage distribution compressed.
The effects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment in European countries
have been discussed in Subsection 3.2. In the Anglo-Saxon regime, employment of unskilled
workers is given by lu (wu) =
(
ρ
wu
) 1
1−ρ =
(
ρ2
µ
) 1
1−ρ . Thus (un-)employment does not
depend on the relative productivity parameter α. In summary, skill-biased technological
change leads to an increase in unemployment in European countries and has no effect on
unemployment in Anglo-Saxon countries:(
∂lu
∂α
· α
lu
)
EU
= − ηY,ls
1− ρ+ ηY,lu
< 0 and
(
∂lu
∂α
· α
lu
)
AS
= 0 (14)
20In several further extensions of the model, we assess the robustness of our results and show that the
central results are kept. These robustness checks are performed with respect to the bargaining regime,
the risk neutrality of workers, and the production technology. (Compare the working paper version of this
article, Weiss and Garloff (2005))
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We end this section by noting that a difference in bargaining power on the side of
labor unions does not suffice to explain the differential unemployment and wage inequality
dynamics between the two sets of countries in the presence of skill-biased technological
change. If as in the model AS, the outside option does not react in response to an increasing
demand for high-skilled labor, unemployment is unchanged irrespectively of the market
power of labor unions. An explanation of the transatlantic difference that is linked to the
bargaining power of labor unions requires a change in the bargaining power. In our model,
it is the interaction of an increasing outside option and (an unchanged) bargaining power
of the workers which cause the unemployment to increase. Of course, we do not negate
the importance of the observed deunionization in the U.S. and UK and see our paper as
complementary to studies that link the transatlantic differences to a change in bargaining
power.
4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effects of skill-biased technological change on unemployment
and wage inequality when benefits are linked to per-capita income. This link to per-capita
income introduces a tie between the wages for different skill groups.
In standard models of union wage setting, wages—especially at the lower end of the
wage distribution—depend on the level of unemployment or social security benefits (which
constitute the workers’ reservation wage). As a consequence, these wages are downwardly
rigid. This rigidity causes unemployment when productivity falls. In our paper, benefits
are endogenous and depend on wages. The interdependence between wages and benefits
yields an allocation where the wage for unskilled labor depends positively on the wage for
skilled labor. The obtained wage rigidity is a rigidity in the relation between the wages for
unskilled and skilled labor. The wage for unskilled labor is too rigid with respect to the
unskilled workers’ productivity and it is overly sensitive to changes in the skilled workers’
productivity.
If—as a result of skill-biased technological change—the productivity of the skilled
workers rises faster than that of the unskilled workers, the wage of the latter increases by
more than would be justified by their productivity gains because it is linked to the skilled
workers’ wage via the benefits. As a result, unemployment of unskilled labor increases.
The matter of concern here is not that the unskilled workers’ wage falls too little—as in
standard union models—but that it rises too much.
The findings of this paper are consistent with the evolution of wages and employment
of unskilled workers in Europe over the past decades. Wages for all skill levels have risen
over this period and, by and large, the employment prospects of the less skilled workers
have deteriorated.
Comparing the social legislation in the U.S. and many European countries, we find
that benefits are linked to the evolution of average income or wages in Continental Europe
but not in the U.S. and the UK. Given this institutional difference, our model predicts
that skill-biased technological change leads to rising unemployment in Continental Europe
and rising wage dispersion in the U.S. and the UK.
We can deduce interesting policy implications from the model. Any increase in the
relative productivity (or more generally in the relative “market value”) of skilled workers
leads to a higher rate of unemployment the European model—even if the absolute produc-
9
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tivity of unskilled workers increases as well, but less than proportionately. From the point
of view of the model, we can blame two factors for the high unemployment of the unskilled.
First, benefits are tied to the average income and second, benefits are a determinant of
the wage of the unskilled. So, any policy measure that aims at weakening either of these
links will decrease unemployment. It is to be noted, however, that our model does not
challenge the principal insight from the literature that there is a tradeoff between wage
inequality and unemployment. A decrease in unemployment would come at the cost of
higher wage inequality. There might be possibilities, however, to overcome this dilemma.
One way might be the introduction of a negative income tax. Such a tax scheme allows
the uncoupling of gross from net wages. Gross wages (and thus wage costs for firms) are
determined by market forces and reflect productivities and at the same time, inequality in
net wages can be kept from growing. These wage subsidies to unskilled workers would have
to be financed, but as these workers would not earn benefits anymore, the government’s
budget might even be relieved.
A Appendix: Empirical Evidence
A.1 The Link Between Benefits and Per-Capita Income
To confirm our main hypothesis, in Section 2 we look at the legislation of 14 countries (see
Figure 1). In addition, here we use an empirical assessment to complement the results
of the legal analysis. For 10 countries the legal situation is clear and confirms our crude
classification in “European” and “Anglo-Saxon” countries. In three “European” countries
Belgium, France, and Spain, benefits are not linked automatically to the average income
or wages. Partly the law itself envisions that there are additional discrete adjustments.
This is the case for example in Belgium. There, the law explicitly allows the king to
adjust the benefit payments to the development of the living standards. As the legal
situation allows these countries to be “European” and “Anglo-Saxon”, we choose the
empirical results to uncover the connection between average wages and benefit levels. For
various reasons direct data on benefit levels are not available: In general, benefit payments
depend on individual characteristics (wealth, income, household size, etc.) and differ across
regions. Furthermore, in-kind transfers often make up an important part of total benefits.
Therefore, we use data on (real) social expenditures on unemployment per unemployed
from the OECD to approximate the benefit payments. We take the social expenditures on
unemployment as a proxy for expenditures on benefits and take the number of unemployed
individuals (from the OECD) as a proxy for the number of benefit recipients.21 The last
row of Figure 1 reports results from regressions of changes in real social expenditures
on unemployment per unemployed on real GDP per capita changes.22 The influence is
significantly positive and roughly of the same magnitude for the three countries, where
the legal situation is ambiguous.To assess the quality of our proxy social expenditures
for unemployment per unemployed, we run the same regression for the other countries
where we know the administrative rules. Most results are as we expect. In particular, the
relation between GDP p.c. and social expenditures per unemployed is insignificant in the
21We use social expenditures on unemployment, since a category for benefits alone does not exist so
that this category comes closest to our needs. Using in addition social expenditures on housing and
incapacity-related benefits does not change the principal conclusions. Results are available upon request.
22It is likely that both real GDP per capita and real social expenditures per unemployed are trended.
We use first differences in order not to run into the problem of a spurious regression.
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Figure 1: Social Security in “Anglo-Saxon” and in “European” Countries
Source: Cantillon, van Mechelen, Marx, and van den Bosch (2004) and MISSOC (Mu-
tual Information System on Social Protection in the EU Member States and the EEA):
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/social protection/index en.html and own calcula-
tion. ∗ means significant on a 5% confidence level.
11
Page 12 of 16
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
U.S. and the UK while it is significant in most European countries.23 The purpose of these
regressions is modest, however: We use the best information we could assemble. That is,
we use the legal situation for the countries where the situation is unambiguous and use
the regression results for the other countries, where the results are at least in accordance
with our classification.
A minimum wage that depends on average wages has a similar effect as benefits that
depend on average wages.24 This is the case in France and Spain, where the minimum
wage is tied to average income by law. So, for these two countries there is an additional
link between the wage of the unskilled and the wage of high-skilled, even when, as in
France, the benefits are not tied to the average income by law. A minimum wage that is
tied to average income also induces adverse employment effects of skill-biased technological
change. Again, for the U.S. and the UK this link does not exist. In the U.S., the minimum
wage has not even been adjusted to consumer prices. In 2000 the minimum wage was 25%
lower in real terms than in 1978 (see Card and DiNardo (2002), Figure 22). In the UK, a
national minimum wage has only been introduced in 1999 and can therefore not account
for changes in inequality and employment in the 1980s and 90s.
A.2 Descriptive Evidence to Proposition 3
Proposition 3 states that skill-biased technological change leads to rising wage inequality
and rising unemployment in European countries because the relative wage cannot fully
adjust to changes in relative labor demand. Put differently: If the wage dispersion in
Europe rises, it does not rise enough and unemployment rises as well. The unemployment
rate should thus be positively correlated with the skill-premium in Europe. For example, in
Germany 1975 - 2004, the correlation between the unemployment rate of the unskilled and
the skill premium has been 0.703.25 This substantiates the theoretical result in Proposition
3.26
For the “Anglo-Saxon” model, we expect a zero correlation between wage dispersion
and unemployment of the unskilled, since wages of the unskilled do not react to changes
in the wages of the skilled. If the wage dispersion increases, it increases enough to adjust
to changes in relative labor demand. Unemployment remains unchanged while wage dis-
persion increases. For the U.S. 1975 - 2003, the correlation between the unemployment
rate of the unskilled and the skill premium has been 0.004.27
23Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal are the exceptions to the rule.
24See Weiss and Garloff (2005).
25Unemployment rates by qualification are from Reinberg and Hummel (2005). The skill premium has
been calculated from administrative data where the wage for unskilled workers is proxied by the lowest
performance group of blue-collar workers (“Leistungsgruppe 3, Arbeiter”) and the wage for skilled workers
is proxied by the highest performance group of white-collar workers (“Leistungsgruppe 2, Angestellte”),
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
26The finding that higher wage dispersion and unemployment are positively correlated (across age-by-
education cells) in Germany is also found and discussed by Fitzenberger and Garloff (forthcoming).
27Unemployment rates by educational attainment stem from U.S. Census Bureau (1975 - 2004) and
Francesconi, Orszag, Phelps, and Zoega (1998). Wages stem from the CPS (U.S. Census Bureau, internet
release, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/incpertoc.html). Unemployment of the unskilled and
wage dispersion are unlikely to contain a trend. While this is obvious for the unemployment rate at least
in an asymptotic sense, it is plausible for wage dispersion, too. Nevertheless, we performed the same
regression in first differences. Albeit less strongly, the results of a regression of the unemployment rate of
the low-skilled on the wage premium in levels is significant for Germany (and insignificant for the United
States).
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